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Whether one views fascism as radical or conservative, however, certain features are almost always associated with it which distinguish it from traditional dictatorships. First, it mobilizes the masses through its propaganda, its party activities, and its public ceremonies. And within the ranks of the movement itself social distinctions are erased. This mass participation in politics is controlled and channeled, as in communist systems, through the technique of a single, all embracing party. Also, in most fascist systems there is a set of vertically structured trade associations, or "corporations," by which capital, labor, and other interests are represented in the government and are controlled by it. Secondly, fascist parties, like Marxist ones, have an ideology which aims at bringing about some utopia. This goal is different from that of traditional dictatorships, which justify themselves on narrower grounds such as the need for law and order, respect for religion and custom, or a defense of national interests. In content fascism rejects the idea of class conflict in favor of class collaboration for the good of the nation-state. And while its corporativist institutions enhance the state's power to regulate the economy they do not propose to abolish private property or the profit motive. Also, fascism rejects Marxian universalism in favor of aggressive nationalism. If fascists seem fascinated by technology it is because an industrial base is the sine qua non for military power and imperialism. Third, fascism's impulse is toward totalitarianism-complete control by the state of all political activity-however much actual fascist regimes may fall short of that goal.
These three general characteristics of fascism should serve to delimit it, as a type of regime, from both traditional and communist dictatorships. Mussolini's Italy is, in the opinion of many scholars, the archetype of such a system. Nolte, for instance, constructs a spectrum of fascisms based on how socialist and totalitarian certain regimes were. Starting with conservative "pre-fascist" regimes like Salazar's Portugal, it ranges to "early fascism" (Franco's Spain), then to "normal fascism" (Mussolini's Italy), and finally to Hitler's "radical fascism." Similarly, H. R. Trevor-Roper distinguishes "clerical fascism," which is the heir of aristocratic conservatism, from 'dynamic" fascism, which draws its support mainly from the industrial middle classes. Every fascist system, he claims, is really a compound of both these elements, but the ratio varies. As in Nolte's scheme Franco and Salazar are placed on the conservative, or "clerical," end of the scale, Hitler's regime is the most radical or "dynamic," and Mussolini's Italy occupies the mid-point-although it 246 TIE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 42, 1980 leans somewhat to the "dynamic" side.5 Fascist Italy may be considered, therefore, a concrete example of a normal fascist system. As such it offers an additional yardstick to the three general characteristics of fascism noted above by which to measure whether or not Peron's dictatorship fits the category.
MASS MOBILIZATION AND CONTROL
Fascism is often assumed to be a movement of the middle and upper classes. Many writers have therefore refused to classify Peron as a fascist because of his regime's presumed working class bias. But in fact a closer look at Peronism and "normal fascism" under Mussolini may require revising current opinion about both systems. Kenworthy points out, for instance, that in the 1946 elections which brought Peron to power, organized labor could have accounted for little more than a third of his vote, at best. Peronism's backing came from a broad spectrum of Argentine society.6 On the other hand, the proletarian character of Italian Fascism has not always been sufficiently emphasized. According to Fascist Party figures, in 1921 there were some 152,000 members, of whom almost 62,000 were blue collar workers, while another 23,000 were clerical employees and soldiers. By 1934 there were 1,850,000 members, and nearly 1,250,000 of those were drawn from the industrial and agricultural working classes. It would seem more accurate to conclude, therefore, that Italian Fascism was more proletarian than is often assumed and that Peronism was less so-and that both were essentially multi-class movements.
In Mussolini's Italy mass participation was channeled through the Fascist Party and the Corporate State, two institutions which gave the regime its distinctive character. The Fascist Party resembled an army, with a clear chain of command running down from Mussolini, through his hand-picked National Secretary and the Grand Council, to the provincial and local organizations. In addition there were ancillary organizations to tie in labor, youth, women, and 248 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 42, 1980 ployers' association could sign a labor contract without official recognition; (2) only one employer and one labor association was permitted in each economic field; (3) all contracts had to be endorsed by the Labor Secretary; (4) the government would collect and disburse all union funds; and (5) strikes and lockouts were forbidden. It was not until 1952, however, that Peron finally succeeded in bringing big business under control by setting up the General Economic Confederation (CGE), to which all entrepreneurs had to belong. In tandem with the Peronist-controlled General Workers' Confederation (CGT) it gave the state enormous regulatory power over the economy. Similar control was placed over higher education through the Peronist General University Confederation, and over the professions with the creation in 1954 of the General Confederation of Professionals. These were the foundations of a "syndicalist state," although it was not called such. Finally, the capstone of this emerging corporativist system was the Economic Consultative Committee, which brought together leading representatives of the CGE, CGT, and the state economic ministries.'0 What about the policies that emerged from these systems? Was Per6n strongly pro-labor while Mussolini favored big business, as conventional wisdom has it? Certainly Italian labor bore much of the brunt of Mussolini's industrial development program. Much of the capital was raised by increasing savings and controlling consumption. Exports, which brought in additional income, were made competitive by keeping wages low. Indeed, wages were rolled back by some 16 per cent between 1928 and 1934. The eight-hour day was also surrendered, and the Fascist-controlled unions now agitated to increase productivity rather than defend labor's class interests. By contrast, under Per6n labor's real wages rose by over 30 percent from 1946 to 1949, and fringe benefits added as much as 40 percent over that. There were also more government services such as public housing, social insurance, health care, and educational opportunities. Workers also worked less. In addition to the large number of legal holidays were frequent unofficial holidays proclaimed by the CGT. By 1951 it was estimated that for every two days that an Argentine laborer worked he was entitled to a day of rest. absenteeism increased so much that on any given day as much as 15 percent of the work force might not show up. Not only was this tolerated by Peron, but workers were rewarded by officially-decreed year-end bonuses amounting to an extra month's wages.":
As for capital, Mussolini turned the Confederation of Italian Industry into an arm of the government, with the power to issue binding regulations for all industrial employers. Also, the government promoted cartelization at the expense of small business, with high profits guaranteed for the top capitalists. Such collaboration finds no parallel in Peron's Argentina. Although profits were high (stock dividends rose by an average of 16 percent a year), businessmen were antagonized by the regime's social legislation. They resented the closing down of their independent Union Industrial Argentina in 1946 after a Peronist faction failed to get control of the executive committee, and they feared the spread of state regulatory power as represented by the Argentine Institute of Production and Trade (IAPI), which forced farmers to sell to it at low fixed prices and then made profits for the government by selling those goods on the free market.12
But while real differences did exist between the two regimes, they were not so great as it might seem, and they tended to narrow the longer Peron was in power. For one thing, the fall in labor wages under Mussolini occurred during the Great Depression, when wages were falling all over the world, and this was accompanied by a similar drop in prices. Also, fringe benefits like paid vacations, social insurance, family subsidies, free medical care, and year-end bonuses helped to compensate for a smaller paycheck. The term "fascism" suggests a tightly-organized dictatorship in which all opposition has been eliminated and all components of the regime are under a military-type discipline. We have seen that some writers refuse to call Peron a fascist because opposition parties continued to exist and even sit in Congress; because elections were held; because there were no storm-troopers; and because certain groups like the army, the clergy, and big industrialists retained a certain degree of autonomy. Are such objections accurate and conclusive?
The 1946 elections, which were marred by violence, resulted in a Peronist sweep of both houses of Congress, all provincial governorships, and all provincial legislatures but one. Only the Radical and Conservative parties managed to get minority representation in Congress. Subsequently, the Socialist, Progressive Democratic, and Communist parties were barred from any hope of representation by changes in the electoral laws. Moreover, the opposition in Congress was reduced even further in 1949 when a bill was passed making it a crime to speak disrespectfully of any government official. Even a congressman could lose his seat and his congressional im- In any case, there is evidence that Peron's opposition would not have been tolerated indefinitely. In 1952 orders went out to all local Peronist Party committees instructing them to compile lists of opponents in every province, department (township), ward, and neighborhoo?1-with the person's address, occupation, place of work, and party affiliation. Local committees were to discover also which government posts in their districts were currently being filled by non-Peronists, and they were to note all sports and cultural clubs in their area so that competing Peronist organizations could be formed. The goal was to "undermine the morale and ability to resist of the enemy" and spread a "sentiment of despair"' among them-to "localize, combat, and neutralize" all their actions. It was necessary to create for the public a Peronist "climate of victory" and an image of "meanness and injustice" in its adversaries. 21 Some writers have suggested that the Peronist regime became really repressive only after the economy turned sour in 1949. Samuel Baily notes that the workers' real wages hit their lowest point in April 1953, the same month in which mobs sacked the Jockey Clubthe preserve of Argentina's traditional social elite-and burned down the opposition parties' headquarters. Other writers point to the abortive military coup of November 1951 as the turning point. It is true that in this period a continual state of siege was imposed which suspended constitutional liberties; that the universities were taken over; that the country's leading newspaper was confiscated; that courses in justicialismo were required in all public schools; and that the campaign against the Catholic Church was started. But there had been high-handed acts before then. Between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Court and all lower courts were purged and filled with Peronists; the constitution was rewritten to expand the executive power and permit Per6n's reelection; dozens of opposition papers were closed down or attacked by hoodlums; provincial and local governments were put under martial law and had their nonPeronist officials removed; and congressmen were expelled for "disrespect." Control del Estado, a secret police operating directly under the president, already had begun infiltrating government agencies, including the military, to weed out disloyal elements. What is more, Pero.n did have the use of strong-arm squads comparable to the Fascist Militia or the Nazi S.A. Although not officially integrated into the Peronist Party, the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, a para-military organization of some one thousand well armed men, was at his service. Although the Alianza was originally an independent nationalist group whose founding predated the regime, it had been taken over by Peronists in 1953. Subsequently, in that same year, its thugs destroyed the Jockey Club, and later, during Peron's struggle with the clergy, it sacked and burned several churches in downtown Buenos Aires. Fanatical to the core, the aliancistas were the last Peronists to surrender when the regime fell in September 1955.24 Finally, if totalitarianism means total dominance it must include control of the military. The Nazi and Soviet dictatorships achieved that goal, but Mussolini did not-since the Italian army deposed him in 1943. Germino, who considers Mussolini a totalitarian, ex- 
